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Many developing countries are attempting to address the inequities of plant breeders’ rights by 
incorporating farmers’ rights provisions in their Plant Variety Protection legislations to reward the role of 
farmers’ as conservers and enhancers of agro-biodiversity. Developing countries expect to generate 
substantial revenues for biodiversity conservation or for community reward schemes through the 
application of farmers’ rights provisions. This paper applies a patent-renewal model to assess the 
economic returns appropriated by plant breeders from new (protected) varieties in developed countries. 
The estimates confirm a widely held view in the literature that plant variety protection is a relatively weak 
form of IPR protection which allows plant breeders to appropriate only limited returns from their 
innovations. Consequently, the application of farmers’ rights provisions in a manner akin to breeders’ rights 
is unlikely to be a source of significant revenue to developing countries. 
 





The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) requires all member 
countries of the WTO to enact a system of plant variety protection (a system of intellectual property rights 
for plant varieties) within a specified time frame. While accepting this obligation, several developing 
countries, especially those rich in biodiversity, have been concerned about the inequities in a system of 
plant breeders’ rights. A key concern has been that while plant variety protection (PVP) systems reward 
plant breeders’ for their innovations, they provide no rewards to farmers or farming communities that have 
conserved and enhanced agro-biodiversity over generations – the very biodiversity that constitutes the 
critical resource base for plant breeders. To address this imbalance, many developing countries are 
attempting to incorporate farmers’ rights provisions in their PVP legislation with the objective rewarding 
farmers/farming communities for their role as conservers of biodiversity (Grain: 2002). These provisions 
also draw inspiration from the Convention on Biological Diversity which recognises the “sovereign rights” of 
nations over their biological resources and encourages them to ensure “equitable benefit sharing “ in their 
exchange and use. There are expectations that the application of farmers’ rights provisions can generate 
large revenues that can be used for community reward schemes or biodiversity conservation activities 
(Swaminathan: 1996). This paper attempts to assess whether such expectations are realistic. 2
 
  Farmers’ rights provisions generally follow one or more of the following the following approaches (1) 
Allowing farmers or farmer groups to stake intellectual property claims over their “traditional” varieties in 
same way as plant breeders seek protection for their new varieties (waiving the “novelty” criterion used in 
most intellectual property law) (2) Limiting the returns that breeders can potentially appropriate through 
protection by forcing them to share these benefits with farmers or farming communities (3)  Imposition of a 
levy on breeders’ profits to create a fund for conservation activities. Under all these approaches, the 
revenues that can be generated through the application of farmers’ rights provisions depend will depend 
upon the returns that are appropriated by plant breeders from conventional PVP systems (with no farmers’ 
rights). A good indicator of the returns that can be appropriated by breeders is the private value of PVP 
certificates in developed countries, where levels of enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) are 
generally high. There have been few empirical studies that attempt to estimate the private value of PVP 
certificates, possibly owing to the lack of data. In this paper we use a patent-renewal model to estimate the 
private value distribution of PVP certificates in three European countries. These models have been 
extensively applied to the valuation of patent rights in industrial property; but they have not been previously 
applied to plant varieties.  
 
2. Renewal Model 
Plant variety protection certificates are seldom marketed or traded and hence their private value is usually 
not observed. Using the model developed by Schankerman and Pakes (1986), we will attempt to infer the 
value of plant variety rights from the economic responses of PVP certificate holders. In almost all countries 
with PVP legislation, certificate holders must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep the certificate in 
force. If it is assumed that certificate holders make their renewal decisions based on the value of returns 
they obtain from the renewal, then the data on renewal of PVP certificates and renewal fee schedules 
contains information on the value of PVP rights. Such a renewal model implies that protected plant 
varieties for which protection is more valuable (e.g. because it commands a larger market share) will be 
protected by payment of renewal fees for longer periods of time. A breeder will not renew protection for a 
variety for which he sees no commercial potential. The estimates of the private value of PVP certificates 
derived from renewal models can be used to supplement the data on the number of PVP certificates as a 
measure of inventive output. It is also possible to estimate how the average value of PVP certificates 
differs across crop groups or over time. If the distribution of the value of PVP certificates is highly skewed 3
 
  and dispersed, then the number of certificates granted alone may not be a good indicator of the value of 
breeders’ innovations.  
 
Following the assumptions of the  Schankerman and Pakes (1986) it is assumed that each cohort of PVP 
certificates is endowed with a distribution of initial returns, which decay deterministically thereafter. The 
model allows both the initial distribution and the decay rate to vary over time. It is assumed that certificate 
holders choose the lifespan of the certificates so as to maximise the discounted value of net returns (i.e. 
current returns minus renewal fees). Schankerman and Pakes show that for a given schedule of renewal 
fees, these assumptions imply a sequence of renewal proportions over age for each cohort. The proportion 
of PVP certificates renewed in each year depends on parameters, which determine the initial distribution of 
returns and the decay rates. Their model estimates a vector of parameters, which makes the renewal 
proportion predicted by the model as close as possible to the ones actually observed. 
 
Let us consider the case of a plant breeder who holds a PVP certificate. Let j denote the cohort year of the 
PVP certificate and t its age so that t + j represents the year (in which renewal decisions are made). In 
order to keep the certificate in force, the breeder has to pay an annual renewal fee which generally varies 
with the age of the certificate. Renewal fees are periodically revised, and once revised, apply to all 
renewals irrespective of the cohort of the certificate. Let the sequence of renewal fees (in real terms and 
taking into account periodic revisions) at different ages be denoted by {Ctj}. A breeder who pays the 
renewal fee earns the return to protection in the following year, which can be denoted by Rtj. It is assumed 
that Rtj is known with certainty at the time the PVP certificate is granted. The breeder has to maximise the 
net value of discounted returns by choosing the optimal age at which to stop paying the renewal fee. 
 
Given an assumed functional form for the distribution of initial revenues, the model derives the relationship 
between the predicted renewal proportions and the vector of parameters of the distribution of initial 
revenues and the decay rates. The functional form, which was found to best fit the sequence of the 
renewal proportions, was the lognormal distribution1. If R0j (initial returns) follows a log-normal distribution, 
then: 
on distributi Normal the denotes N(.) where ) , ( ~
2
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Using a log normal functional form for the distribution of initial revenues, the model yields the following 
estimation equation: 
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where  dτ j =  1 -δ τ j  and δ τ j  is the decay rate of initial revenues of cohort j in each time period.  
Ptj = Proportion of certificates of cohort j renewed at time t. 
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) allow for inter-cohort differences in the distribution of the initial returns, by 
allowing cohort specific variation of µ , but maintaining a common value of σ . This is equivalent to letting 
cohorts of PVP certificates differ by a proportional rescaling of the initial revenues of all certificates in a 
given cohort. They also allow decay rates to vary across decades. Thus, if the renewal data span three 
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Positive values of β 1 and β 2 indicate a decline in the rate of decay during decade 2 and decade 3 relative 
to decade 1.The estimation of the value of PVP certificates was based on the above equation. The 
equation was estimated using non-linear least squares   One modification made in estimating the value of 
PVP certificates was that instead of allowing cohort-specific values of µ , the value of µ  was allowed to vary 
only across decades or five yearly intervals. This was owing to the limited span of the data for some 
countries.  
 
3.  Description of Data 
The estimation of the value of PVP certificates was attempted for France, Germany and the Netherlands 
for cereals/agricultural crops and ornamentals2. These three countries were selected for analysis because 
_____________________ 
2 The crop groups considered were cereals and ornamentals in the case of France and agricultural crops and ornamentals in the 
case of Germany and the Netherlands. All agricultural crops were together considered as a group in the case of Germany and 
the Netherlands in order to provide sufficiently larger cohort sizes. 5
 
  they have had PVP legislation since the late 1960s and are among the countries that have issued the 
largest number of PVP certificates. They were, thus, able to provide fairly large cohort sizes in these two 
crop groups3. 
 
The data on grant and renewal of PVP certificates was put together using a database of PVP certificates 
obtained from UPOV. Using this database it was possible to derive for each cohort the proportion of PVP 
certificates renewed at different ages. There are three important components of the total cost of obtaining a 
PVP certificate. These are (a) application fee (b) examination fee for DUS testing and (3) annual renewal 
fee for keeping the certificate in force. While the application fee is a one-time fee, the examination fee has 
to be paid for each year or growing season over which the variety is tested and the renewal fee has to be 
paid each year.  Information on renewal fees applicable to different crop groups at different ages was 
obtained from UPOV and the PVP authorities of the three countries. The fees applicable in nominal terms 
were converted into real terms (1998=100) using a GDP deflator. The real fees in national currencies were 
converted into US dollars using the exchange rate for 1998. The data used for the analysis is described in 
Table-1. 
Table-1: Description of Data Used in Renewal Model 
  Agricultural Crops 
Part A  France Germany  Netherlands 
Range of cohorts  1974-1999  1988-1999  1989-1999 
Range of years  1975-2000  1989-2000  1990-2000 
Number of observations  324  88  75 
Total number of PVP certificates in all cohorts  3666  1212  825 
Mean number of PVP certificates per cohort  141  101  182 
Ratio of between age variance to total variance in Ptj (proportion renewed)  0.91  0.87  0.88 
Ratio of between age to total variance in renewal costs (Ctj) 0.997  0.99  0.98 
Ratio of between age to total variance in mortality rates  0.36  0.46  0.23 
Part B  Ornamental crops 
  France Germany  Netherlands 
Range of cohorts  1974-1999  1988-1999  1989-1999 
Range of years  1975-2000  1989-2000  1990-2000 
Number of observations  283  87  73 
Total number of PVP certificates in all cohorts  4836  7896  3396 
Mean number of PVP certificates per cohort  186  658  308 
Ratio of between age variance to total variance in Ptj (proportion renewed)  0.907  0.95  0.89 
Ratio of between age to total variance in renewal costs (Ctj) 0.99  0.99  0.99 
Ratio of between age to total variance in mortality rates  0.34  0.75  0.51 
 
 
4.   Estimation of the Renewal Model 
The results of the estimation of the renewal model for agricultural crops are presented in Table-2. For each 





  results of a model, which allows for no cohort specific variation in the distribution of initial revenues (µ j = 
µ  for all j). Regression (2) allows µ j to vary across time periods. For France, where a longer span of data 
was available, the µ js are allowed to vary across three decades. That is, µ 1 represents the value of µ  in 
the period 1974-1979, µ 2 the value in the period 1980-1989 and µ 3 the value in the period 1990-1999. For 
the Netherlands and Germany, where the data span was shorter, µ  varies across time periods, with µ 1 
representing the value of µ  in the period before 1994 and µ 2 the value in the period after 1994. 1994 was 
the year in which the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) was set up, which allowed breeders to 
switch from national level protection to EU-wide protection. Regression (3) allows µ  t o  v a r y  a s  i n  
regression (2) but in addition allows variation in the decay rates. In the case of France there is separate 
value of δ  for each of the periods, 1974-1979, 1980-1989 and 1990-1999 while for the Netherlands and 
Germany there is a separate decay rate for the periods before and after 1994. 
Table-2: Regression Results of Renewal Models for PVP Certificates-Agricultural Crops* 
  France  Netherlands  Germany 
Parameters 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2)  (3) 
µµµµ   6.67 
(0.216) 
- 
  -  6.03 





µµµµ 1  -  6.93 
(0.24) 
7.08 
(0.27)  -  6.15 
(0.14) 
6.05 






µµµµ 2  -  6.80 
(0.21) 
6.83 
(0.21)  -  5.81 
(0.11) 
5.85 





µµµµ 3  -  6.25 
(0.18) 
6.16 
(0.17)  - - - -    






































ββββ 1  - -  -0.023$ 
(0.03)  - -  0.10 
(0.02)   -  -0.13$ 
(0.15) 
ββββ 2  - -  0.026$ 
(0.03)  - - -  - - 
δδδδ 1**  - -  0.20  -   0.13   -  0.21 
δδδδ 2**  - -  0.16  - - -  -  
R2  0.81 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.75 0.82 0.84 
df  321  319  317  85 84 83 74 73 72 
µ 1 = Relates to 1974-1979 
µ 2 = Relates to 1980-1989 
µ 3 = Relates to 1990-1999 
µ 1 = Relates to 1988-1994 
µ 2 = Relates to 1995-1999 
µ 1 = Relates to 1989-1994 
µ 2 = Relates to 1995-1999 
Note: 
β 1= Relates to 1980-1989 
β 2= Relates to 1990-1999 
β 1= Relates to 1995-1999  β 1= Relates to 1995-1999 
* Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
**δ 1 = 1-(1-δ )*exp(β 1) and δ 2 = 1-(1-δ )*exp(β 2) 
# A very small positive value. 
$ Not significant at 5% or 10% level of significance. 7
 
  Agricultural crops 
 
The key parameters of the model µ , σ  and δ  all have the right signs and are statistically significant4. The 
high values of R2 indicate that the lognormal distribution fits the data reasonably well5. An F-test clearly 
rejects the hypothesis that all the µ s are equal, that is there is no inter-cohort variation in the distribution of 
initial revenues. The mean value of the initial distribution of revenues from a cohort of varieties is given by 
2 5 . 0 σ µ + e in a log-normal distribution. In France (taking the figures from regression (3)), the mean value of 
initial revenues has steadily declined over the decades from US $3,448 in the 1970s to $2,685 in the 
1980s to $1,374 the 1990s. In the Netherlands, the mean value has declined from $692 in the period 1988-
1994 to $566 in the post-1994 period. In Germany, the mean value has increased marginally from $956 in 
1989-1994 to $1,089 in the post-1994 period. In general, the initial distribution of revenues for agricultural 
crop varieties is higher in France than in the other two countries. The decline in mean values in France and 
the Netherlands has taken place alongside an increase in the number of PVP certificates issued (except in 
the post-1995 period when the number of certificates issued annually in these countries has not increased 
– possibly owing to the increasing use of EU-wide protection by breeders). Thus, while the number of 
innovations produced and offered for protection has increased over time, the average value of innovations 
has decreased over time. A decline in the mean value of initial revenues suggests that the market share 
likely to be acquired by the average protected variety has declined over time. This may be because of 
competition from a larger number of varieties in the market or because the incremental benefits from 
varieties in successive cohorts are declining. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of a few 
varieties in the tail of the distribution from acquiring very large market shares.  
  
The degree of skewness in the distribution of initial returns is illustrated by the ratio of the mean to the 
median value. For the log-normal distribution this is given by 
2 5 . 0 σ e . The ratio is 2.9 for France, 1.63 for 
the Netherlands and 1.52 for Germany. The distribution of initial revenues is, thus, skewed to the right and 
rather sharply so in the case of France. The estimated rates of decay (regression (2)) are the largest for 
France (18%), lower for the Netherlands (9%) and almost zero for Germany. In the case of Germany, for 
agricultural crops, PVP fees are considerably higher than those of the Netherlands and France. The co-
_____________________ 
4 The only parameter not significant at the 5% level of significance is the parameter β 1 in the case of France and Germany and 
β 2  in the case of France as shown in the Table-2. 
5 R2 is computed as 1 -(Residual sum of squares/Corrected total sum of squares). In the case of non-linear regression R2 is not 
bound by 0 and 1.  8
 
  efficient of variation of the distribution of initial revenues (which is a function of σ 6) is also the lowest for 
Germany. Taken together, the high level of PVP fees for agricultural crops combined with possibly more 
stringent examination of applications in Germany results in the selection of varieties, which suffer no decay 
in returns, at least over the first ten years. When we allow decay rates to vary, we find that in France decay 
rates increased in the 1980s in relation to the 1970s, but decreased in the 1990s. In the Netherlands, the 
decay rates increased sharply from 4% in the 1988-1994 period to 13% in the post-1994 period. Similarly, 
in Germany the decay rate appears to jump from zero prior to 1994 to 21% in the post 1994 period, though 
it must be noted the co-efficient β 1, which produces this effect, is not significant. An increase in decay rates 
could reflect greater competition leading to faster turnover of varieties. However, the sharp increase in 
decay rates in the Netherlands and Germany is possibly an artefact of the data. After the CPVO was 
established in 1994, many protected varieties switched from national protection to EU-wide protection 
through the CPVO. But for acquiring EU-wide rights, national rights have to be surrendered or kept 
suspended. The large surrenders of varieties switching to EU-wide protection may be responsible for the 
sharp jump in decay rates after 1994 and may be a “one-off” phenomenon. Such switching would be most 
likely in countries where fee levels are high and close to that of the CPVO. As noted above, Germany has 
the highest fees for agricultural crops among individual countries (82.9% of the CPVO fees) while the level 
of fees in the Netherlands (43% of CPVO fees) are higher than those in France (28% of CPVO fees). 
 
Ornamental crops 
The results of the renewal model for ornamental crops are presented in Table-3. The three sets of 
regressions are the same as that for agricultural crops. The results for ornamental crops are a very similar 
to those for agricultural crops. Again, the key parameters of the model µ , σ  and δ  all have the right signs 
and are statistically significant (though β 1 and β 2 are not significant in the case of France and β 1 in the 
case of Germany). In the case of ornamental crops too, the mean value of the initial distribution of 
revenues is the highest in the case of France. The mean value in France (Regression (3)) has steadily 
declined over the decades from $2,735 the 1970s to $2,195 in the 1980s to $1,442 in the 1990s. If we 
compare the mean values for the 1990s, the value in France is almost twice that in the Netherlands and 
nearly six times that in Germany. In the case of the Netherlands, the mean value has marginally increased 
from $784 in the pre-1994 period to $816 in the post 1994 period. In Germany, over the same period, the 
mean value declined by 10% from $253 to $226. While we do not have estimates of the long-term trend of 
_____________________ 
6 
2 / 1 ) 1 ( CV   on, distributi   normal - log   a For 
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  mean values in Germany and the Netherlands, it is likely that they have been declining as in the case of 
France. There has been a steady upward growth in the number of certificates in each of these countries, 
especially in the late 1980s and till the mid-1990s. Therefore, as in the case of agricultural crops, the 
number of new varieties or innovations produced every year has increased over time, but the value of the 
average innovation has decreased. The number of new varieties protected and the mean value of initial 
revenues appear to have moved in opposite directions. This again may be the result of a larger number of 
varieties competing for market share. 
 
Table-3: Regression Results of Renewal Models for PVP Certificates-Ornamentals* 
  France  Netherlands  Germany 





  -  6.10 
(0.09)  - -  5.18 
(0.17)  - - 
µµµµ 1  -  6.46 
(0.33) 
6.33 
(0.34)  -  6.11 
(0.09) 
6.06 




µµµµ 2  -  6.11 
(0.27) 
6.11 
(0.27)  -  6.07 
(0.1) 
6.10 




µµµµ 3  -  5.64 
(0.23) 
5.69 









































ββββ 1  - -  -0.014$ 
(0.04)  - -  -0.05 
(0.01)  - -  -0.019$ 
(0.02) 
ββββ 2  - -  -0.039$ 
(0.04)  - - - - - - 
δδδδ 1**  -  - 0.20 -  - 0.12 -  -  .01 
δδδδ 2**  - -  0.22  - - - - -  
R2  0.78 0.80 .80 0.94 .94  .95 0.85 .86  .86 
df  279  277  275  84 83 82 71 70 69 
µ 1 = Relates to 1974-1979 
µ 2 = Relates to 1980-1989 
µ 3 = Relates to 1990-1999 
µ 1 = Relates to 1988-1994 
µ 2 = Relates to 1995-1999 
µ 1 = Relates to 1989-1994 
µ 2 = Relates to 1995-1999 
Note: 
β 1= Relates to 1980-1989 
β 2= Relates to 1990-1999 
β 1= Relates to 1995-1999  β 1= Relates to 1995-1999 
* Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
**δ 1 = 1-(1-δ )*exp(β 1) and δ 2 = 1-(1-δ )*exp(β 2) 
# A very small positive value. 
$ Not significant at 5% or 10% level of significance. 
 
The distribution of initial revenues is skewed to the right in the case of ornamentals as well. The mean to 
median ratio (from regression (2)) is 4.87 for France, 1.83 for the Netherlands and 1.35 for Germany. The 
decay rates based on regression (2) are the highest in France (21%) followed by the Netherlands (9.5%) 10
 
  and nearly zero for Germany. The coefficient of variation is once again the lowest for Germany, which 
reinforces the conclusion that the German PVP system ‘selects’ varieties that suffer almost no decay in 
returns in the first ten years. When we allow for variation in decay rates (regression (3)) we find that decay 
rates have increased marginally in France from 19% in the 1970s to 22% the 1990s. It must be noted, 
however, that the co-efficient of β 1 and β 2 are not significant at the 5% level of significance. If β 1 and β 2 
are not significantly different from zero then the decay rate has not changed over the decades. In Germany 
too, the decay rates have remained at zero for the 1989-1999 period (co-efficient of β 1 is not significant). In 
the Netherlands, the decay rate has increased from 7% during 1988-1994 to 12% in the post 1994 period. 
 
5.  Private value of PVP Certificates 
The parameters of the renewal model estimated for agricultural crops and ornamentals can be used to 
derive the private value of PVP certificates i.e. the returns that are appropriated by the titleholder. The 
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where Rt - Ct is the net return from holding a PVP certificate during age t, i is the discount rate, δ  is the 
decay rate and T is the optimal life span of the PVP certificate based on the renewal rule discussed earlier 
(i.e. the certificate will be renewed only if Rt > Ct). The assumption of a log-normal distribution for the initial 
revenues (R0) for a cohort of certificates leads to a distribution of V. The estimates of the parameters µ , σ  
and δ  are used to generate the distribution of V by simulation. To do this, 50,000 random variables were 
drawn from a log-normal distribution with the estimated values of µ  and σ  and V was calculated for each 
one of them using the decay rate, the renewal fees applicable in any given year and the renewal rule. From 
this derived distribution of V, the quantiles of the private value of PVP certificates could be derived. Tables 
4 and 5 present for agricultural crops and ornamentals respectively the distribution of the private value of 
PVP certificates for the 1989 cohort in each country. In the case of France the estimates for a cohort of 






  Table-4: Value Distribution of PVP Certificates - Agricultural Crops* 










  7113.24 3708.02  863.76  4521.98 
Minimum 
  .00 .00 .00 .00 
Maximum 
  720521.31 413864.00  55211.94  187109.45 
Percentile 25 
  378.18 124.22  .00  243.70 
Percentile 50 
  1726.19 698.17  156.03 1364.29 
Percentile 75 
  6028.70 2858.86  732.90  4422.26 
Percentile 95 
  28079.44 15139.61  3880.55  19305.17 
Percentile 99 
  89076.82 49844.01 11093.53 45620.16 
Range 
  720521.31 413864.00  55211.94  187109.45 
*The simulations were based on the values of the parameters µ , σ  and δ  from Regression (2) in Table-2 
 
Table-5: Value Distribution of PVP Certificates - Ornamental Crops* 










  5942.71 3797.88 1863.15  505.60 
Minimum 
  .00 .00 .00 .00 
Maximum 
  1170011.03 768484.66  118026.04  23884.90 
Percentile 25 
  120.34 57.12  33.91  .00 
Percentile 50 
  794.98 435.30 400.00  94.21 
Percentile 75 
  3564.38 2156.71 1662.08  492.44 
Percentile 95 
  22455.89 14494.68  8151.09  2166.29 
Percentile 99 
  90858.15 59430.69 22374.78  6076.59 
Range 
  1170011.03 768484.66  118026.04  23884.90 
*The simulations were based on the values of the parameters µ , σ  and δ  from Regression (2) in Table-3 
 
The key feature of the value distribution for both agricultural crops and ornamental crops is the sharp 
skewness. There is a high concentration of PVP certificates with very limited economic value. For the 1989 
cohort of agricultural crops the median value of a PVP certificate is only $698 in France, $156 in the 
Netherlands and $1364 in Germany. For the 1989 cohort of ornamentals the median value is $435 in 
France, $400 in the Netherlands and just $94 in Germany. There is a sharp rise in the value of PVP 
certificates in the third quantile, but most of the value of PVP certificates is concentrated in the tail of the 12
 
  distribution, especially in the top 1%. For agricultural crops only 1% of the protected varieties are worth 
more than $49,844 in France, $11,093 in the Netherlands and $45,620 in Germany. For ornamentals just 
1% of the protected varieties were worth more than $14,484 in France, $8,151 in the Netherlands and 
$2,166 in Germany. The inescapable conclusion is that the bulk of PVP certificates provide only very 
limited economic returns to breeders7. The highly skewed distribution of private value of PVP rights is 
consistent with the results of studies of the values of patent rights for industrial products. 
 
Interestingly, in France, the mean value of private returns appropriated from ornamental varieties was 
nearly the same as that appropriated from agricultural crop varieties. In the Netherlands, the mean value of 
ornamentals was more than twice that of agricultural crops. This is a surprising result considering that the 
volume of seed sales in agricultural crops is of a completely different order of magnitude8 from that in 
ornamental crops. In most countries PVP grants are dominated by grants for ornamental varieties.  The 
absence of farmers' exemption (plant back rights) in the case of ornamentals and the ease of detecting IPR 
infringements are likely to considerably increase the appropriability of returns from protected varieties of 
ornamentals. The estimates of the discounted value of returns from ornamental varieties in Table-5 show 
that the absolute the value of returns from protected ornamental varieties matches or exceeds that of 
agricultural crop varieties. This may explain the large number of grants for ornamentals in most countries. 
This also illustrates the loss of revenue to breeders, which takes place due to farmers' exemption in the 
case of agricultural crops. 
 
The estimated total discounted value (at 10% discount rate) of plant variety protection for all the certificates 
issued in the 1989 cohort can be obtained by multiplying the mean value in Tables 4 and 5 with the 
number of grants made in that year in each country. The estimated discounted value can be compared 
with the level of R&D expenditures for agriculture in each country. This has been attempted in Table-6 
below. We do not have the break-up of R&D expenditure between agricultural crops and ornamental crops. 
Therefore, the estimated discounted value shown in Table-6 is based on the mean value for agricultural 
_____________________ 
7 It must be clarified that these results do not imply that international seed companies do not make large profits on the sale of 
new varieties. The results only suggest that the returns to holding IPRs (that too in the form of PVP and not patents) are modest. 
There are other sources of economic returns in the seed business, e.g. market power.  
8 No figures are available on the volume of sales of seeds or planting material of ornamental crop; however, comparisons in 
terms of value can be made. The estimated value of agricultural crop output in France in 1997 was approximately FFR 163,481 
million, while the output of flowers and ornamental plants was FFR 6306 million. Given that there are a much larger number of 
protected varieties of ornamental plants than there are of agricultural crops, a common value of mean of estimated returns for 
agricultural and ornamental crops implies that the share of the value of output appropriated by breeders is much greater in the 
case of ornamental crops. 
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  crops (Table-4) or for ornamental crops (Table-5) whichever is higher. Choosing the higher of the two 
values implies that the estimated total discounted value of the cohort is biased upward. This will only 
reinforce the implications that follow. Though the estimates are provided for a single cohort, the results are 
not sensitive to the choice of cohort. 
Table-6: Returns from PVP Certificates and Agricultural R&D Expenditure (1989) 
                                                                                                                        (All values in constant 1998 US dollars) 
  France Netherlands    Germany 
Number of PVP grants made in 1989  483  751  309 
Estimated mean discounted value of PVP grants of 1989 
cohort  
3797 1863  4521 
Total estimated value of the whole cohort of 1989 (= 
mean value x number of grants) 
1.833 million  1.399 million  1.396 million 
R&D expenditure on agriculture by business enterprisesa  159.90 million  82.52 million  28.83 million 
Public sector R&D expendtureb  601.45 million  111.48 million  293.49 million 
Total R&D expenditure  639.57 million  194 million  322.32 million 
Discounted value of PVP grants as a percentage of total 
R&D expenditure 
0.24% 0.72%  0.43% 
a Source: OECD Basic Science and Technology Statistics 1999 (R&D Expenditure by business enterprises on “Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Forestry”)  
b Source: OECD Basic Science and Technology Statistics 1999  (Government budgetary outlays on R&D for the socio-economic 
objective “Agriculture”) 
 
Table-6 shows that the value of private rights created by PVP range from 0.24% to 0.72% of the research 
expenditure under the head "agriculture, fisheries and forestry". In the literature on evaluation of returns 
from agricultural research, estimates of rates of return of 30% and above are quite common (see for 
instance the survey by Alston et al: 1998b). These estimates relate to the total social returns from R&D and 
not to private returns alone. These studies also vary considerably in the elements of agricultural research 
expenditure that they include in the analysis. Nevertheless, an important conclusion that can be drawn is 
that a large part of the returns from agricultural R&D do not result from the ability of plant 
breeders/titleholders to secure protection for new plant varieties9. If private returns to PVP certificates 
constitute less than 1% of agricultural R&D expenditures, then it is clear that breeders are able to 
appropriate only a very small fraction of the total returns (social plus private) that they generate. Therefore, 
in tune with what has been argued in the rest of the literature, PVP emerges as relatively weak IPR 
measure because it allows private appropriation of only a small fraction of the returns generated by an 
innovation10.  
_____________________ 
9 Similar conclusions about the role of patents in the context of industrial products were reported by Taylor and Silbertson (1973) 
on the basis of an extensive study of UK industry. 
 
10 It is true that the figures of agricultural R&D expenditure used in Table-6 do not relate to plant breeding expenditures alone, 
though it is important to note that they do not include R&D expenditures on agro-chemicals or “food and beverages” which are 
included in agricultural research expenditures in many studies (see for instance Alston et al.: 1998a). If agricultural R&D 
expenditures are restricted to plant breeding expenditures alone, then the percentage of estimated discounted value of PVP 14
 
  The weakness of PVP as an IPR measure has certain other implications as well. If plant breeders have 
stronger alternative modes of protecting their varieties, they will switch to them and the use of PVP is likely 
to decline. This trend is most sharply visible in the U.S. where the number of PVP certificates issued every 
year has declined from about 300-400 to about 60-70 in the late 1990s, while the number of utility patents 
issued for plant varieties has steadily increased. This trend is not yet very apparent in European countries 
possibly because of the legal uncertainties surrounding the patentability of plant varieties11. As alternative 
modes of protection become available, the switch away from PVP can be expected in other countries as 
well. Thus, while developing countries currently in the process of enacting PVP legislation are worried 
about the monopoly profits that plant breeders may reap, in developed countries the use of PVP is likely to 
decline because it facilitates only limited appropriability. As private participation in plant breeding increases 
in developing countries, they too will face demands for strengthening of PVP or for stronger modes of 
protection of new plant varieties.  
 
6.  Implications for Farmers’ Rights 
. The results of this paper show that for the bulk of PVP certificates, the economic returns appropriated by 
plant breeders or titleholders are fairly modest. The problem with PVP is not that it provides large 
monopoly rents to plant breeders, but that it allows insufficient appropriability. If the intention of developing 
countries is to encourage investment in plant breeding by facilitating appropriation of larger returns from 
innovation, then there is clearly a case for making PVP stronger. This may involve strong enforcement of 
breeders' rights, restriction of farmer-to-farmer exchanges to strictly non-commercial transactions and 
possibly restrictions on the use farm-saved seed for large farmers. Owing to problems in enforcement of 
breeders' rights, appropriability in developing countries is likely to be poorer than in developed countries. 
Unless PVP is strengthened, it will simply not have the effect of stimulating private investment in plant 
breeding of non-hybrid crops. 
 
Large monopoly rents could possibly be a feature of protected varieties in the tail of the value of 
distribution. In practice, if the distribution of initial revenues in a cohort of protected varieties depends on 
 
rights to agricultural research expenditures would no doubt increase. But this would not alter the basic conclusion that by using 
protection plant breeders are able to appropriate only a small portion of the total returns that their innovations generate.  
 
11 The European Patent Convention does not allow plant varieties to be protected. However, the position may change as the 
result of the European Union’s “Directive on the Protection of Biotechnology Inventions  (Directivr 94/44EC) which contains 
specific provisions on the patentability of genetically engineered biological material including plants and animals. However, there 
are still a number of unresolved issues (see Eratt et al.: 2000) 15
 
  the market share attained by each12, then what this means is that there will be a limited number of 
varieties that will acquire large market shares and hence earn large profits. But even in the case of 
varieties in the tail of the distribution, the return appropriated by the breeder is still likely to be a small 
fraction of the incremental agricultural output generated through the use of the new variety13. The potential 
for monopoly profits from a variety protected under PVP should be carefully distinguished from that of a 
transgenic or genetically-modified (GM) variety. The GM varieties are invariably (in the U.S.A.) protected 
by patents that allow no farmers’ and researchers' exemption and carry a price premium that goes under 
the name of a “technology fee”. The reuse of seed by farmers is prevented by stringent contractual terms, 
which are monitored intensively by the giant "life-science" companies. The appropriability in the case of 
GM varieties is, therefore, entirely different from that of a variety protected under conventional PVP. The 
problem of monopoly profits accruing to a very limited number of protected varieties can also be addressed 
by the judicious use of compulsory licensing provisions that are a part of PVP legislation in most countries. 
 
In the context of the the Indian legislation which  provides for all the three approaches to operationalising 
farmers’ rights – protection of farmers’ varieties, compulsory sharing of benefits with farmers and a levy14 
on breeders’ profits- the results of this paper lead to a fairy pessimistic view about the potential success of 
these approaches. If the bulk of protected varieties yield only modest private returns, then there may not 
be any benefits to share. The introduction of compulsory benefit-sharing arrangements will probably only 
discourage innovation (by reducing breeders’ returns even further), while at the same time providing no 
significant benefits to farming communities. Similarly a levy on breeders’ profits is also unlikely to generate 
significant revenues even if we include varieties in tail of the distribution. The total discounted value of the 
_____________________ 
12 Theoretically, the discounted value of returns from a variety will depend on the price of the new variety, its market share (i.e. 
volume of sales) and the cost of production. The cost of production of a protected variety is not likely to be very different from 
that of competing varieties. There is also some evidence to suggest that protected varieties do not enjoy any significant price 
premium over non-protected varieties (Lesser: 1990). Therefore, the returns from a variety are likely to be a function of the 
market share of a variety and the seed replacement behaviour of farmers, which we assume does not change in the short run. 
 
13 For instance, in our simulation the maximum value appropriated by the breeder of an agricultural crop variety is approximately 
US $ 720,000 in France (Table-4). Let us take the case of a very successful wheat variety in  the tail of the distribution, which 
attains a peak of market share of 10 per cent. If we assume that a successful variety must have an incremental yield gain of 
0.5% above other competing varieties, then it can be shown, ceteris paribus,(assuming a total wheat area of 5.11 million 
hectares in France, current yield level of 6.6 tonnes per hectare and a wheat price of $140 per tonne) that the annual value of 
incremental output would be $2.36 million and its discounted value at 10 per cent discount rate over a period of 5 years $6.7 
million. The breeder, thus, appropriates just 10.7% of the discounted value of incremental output. It must be remembered that 
even this happens only in the case of a highly successful variety. 
 
14 The option of an international levy on protected varieties to raise funds for conservation was considered in the context of the 
FAO’s Global Plan of Action for the Conservation and Sustainable Utilisation of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture” (FAO :1996) 
 16
 
  1989 cohort of PVP certificates in France in Table-6 is approximately US $1.83 million (in 1998 constant 
dollars). Even a 10% levy on breeders’ returns15 would yield only $183,000, which is quite small in relation 
to the requirement of funds for conservation activities. The amounts generated in developing countries may 
be much smaller. The administrative costs of implementing such a levy would likely be high as it involves 
monitoring variety-wise sales /profits on a national basis for all protected varieties. The fundamental 
problem in giving effect to farmers’ rights is that PVP allows only very limited appropriability of returns 
breeders in the first instance.  
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have used a renewal model to estimate the distribution of private value of PVP grants. The 
most striking feature of the value distribution of PVP grants is their sharp skewness, which indicates that 
there is a large concentration of PVP rights with very little economic value. PVP emerges as a relatively 
weak IPR measure, which allows the private appropriation of only a small fraction of the total returns from 
an innovation. In developed countries, there are already signs that PVP is being replaced by stronger 
forms of IPRs as the instrument of choice for protection. A large part of the returns from agricultural R&D 
expenditures are not attributable to the ability of plant breeders to secure protection for their new varieties. 
From the perspective of developing countries, apprehensions that breeders (on an average) will secure 
abnormal monopoly rents are not warranted. The bulk of protected varieties provide only modest returns to 
breeders and PVP can even be viewed as a relatively low-cost method of stimulating innovations in plant 
varieties. If the policy intention of developing countries is to stimulate plant breeding, then there is clearly a 
case for strengthening the level of protection provided by PVP rather than weakening it, as some 
developing countries are attempting to do. Given the modest appropriability associated with PVP, attempts 
to give effect to farmers’ rights through mandatory benefit-sharing arrangements or a levy on breeders’ 
profits are unlikely to prove fruitful. 
_____________________ 
15 The proposal for a levy on sales of protected varieties to raise funds for conservation activities is discussed in Swaminathan 
(1996). It must be noted that only a portion of a levy on the sale of protected varieties will be borne by breeders depending on 
the elasticity of demand for the variety. 17
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